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Abstract Drive-by downloads are the preferred distrib-
ution vector for many malware families. In the drive-by
ecosystem, many exploit servers run the same exploit kit and
it is a challenge understanding whether the exploit server
is part of a larger operation. In this paper, we propose a
technique to identify exploit servers managed by the same
organization. We collect over time how exploit servers are
configured, which exploits they use, and what malware they
distribute, grouping servers with similar configurations into
operations. Our operational analysis reveals that although
individual exploit servers have a median lifetime of 16 h,
long-lived operations exist that operate for several months.
To sustain long-lived operations, miscreants are turning to
the cloud, with 60 % of the exploit servers hosted by special-
ized cloud hosting services. We also observe operations that
distribute multiple malware families and that pay-per-install
affiliate programs are managing exploit servers for their affil-
iates to convert traffic into installations. Furthermore, we
analyze the exploit polymorphism problem, measuring the
repacking rate for different exploit types. To understand how
difficult is to takedown exploit servers, we analyze the abuse
reporting process and issue abuse reports for 19 long-lived
servers. We describe the interaction with ISPs and hosting
providers and monitor the result of the report. We find that
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61 % of the reports are not even acknowledged. On aver-
age, an exploit server still lives for 4.3 days after a report.
Finally, we detail the Maliciadataset we have collected and
are making available to other researchers.
Keywords Drive-by download operations · Malicia
dataset · Malware distribution · Cybercrime
1 Introduction
Drive-by downloads have become the preferred distribution
vector for many malware families [19,38]. A major contribut-
ing factor has been the proliferation of specialized under-
ground services such as exploit kits and exploitation-as-a-
service that make it easy for miscreants to build their own
drive-by distribution infrastructure [19]. In this ecosystem,
many organizations license the same exploit kit, essentially
running the same software in their exploit servers (upgrades
are free for the duration of the license and promptly applied).
This makes it challenging to identify which drive-by oper-
ation a exploit server belongs to. This is fundamental for
understanding how many servers an operation uses, which
operations are more prevalent, how long operations last,
and for prioritizing takedown efforts and law enforcement
investigations.
A drive-by operation is a group of exploit servers managed
by the same organization and used to distribute malware fam-
ilies the organization monetizes. An operation may distribute
multiple malware families, e.g., for different monetization
schemes. A malware family may also be distributed by dif-
ferent operations. For example, malware kits such as zbot or
spyeye are distributed by many organizations building their
own botnets. And, pay-per-install (PPI) affiliate programs
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give each affiliate organization a customized version of the
same malware to distribute [7].
In this paper, we propose a technique to identify exploit
servers managed by the same organization, even when those
exploit servers may be running the same software (i.e., exploit
kit). Our technique enables reducing the large number of
individual exploit servers discovered daily, to a smaller,
more manageable, number of operations. Our intuition is
that servers managed by the same organization are likely
to share parts of their configuration. Thus, when we find
two servers sharing configuration (e.g., pointed by the same
domain, using similar URLs, or distributing the same mal-
ware), this is a strong indication of both being managed by the
same organization. To collect the configuration information,
we track exploit servers over time and classify the malware
they distribute.
Our clustering can be used by law enforcement during
the pre-warrant (plain view) phase of a criminal investiga-
tion [53]. During this phase, criminal activity is monitored
and targets of importance are selected among suspects. The
goal of the plain view phase is gathering enough evidence to
obtain a magistrate-issued warrant for the ISPs and hosting
providers for the servers in the operation. Our clustering can
identify large operations that use multiple servers, rank oper-
ations by importance, and help understanding whether they
belong to individual owners or to distribution services.
Results. Our data collection has been running for one year
and has tracked 502 exploit servers. Our analysis reveals two
types of drive-by operations. Two-thirds of the operations
use a single server and are short lived. The other third of the
operations uses multiple servers to increase their lifetime.
These multi-server operations have a median lifetime of 5.5
days and some live for several months, despite individual
exploit servers living a median of 16 h. Miscreants are able
to run long-lived operations by relying on pools of exploit
servers, replacing dead servers with clones. We also observe
a few short-lived multi-server operations (lasting less than
a day) that use over a dozen exploit servers in parallel to
achieve a burst of installations. While most short-lived oper-
ations distribute a single malware family, we observe multi-
server operations often distributing more than one. Further-
more, we identify two PPI affiliate programs (the winweb-
sec fake antivirus and the zeroaccess botnet) that manage
exploit servers so that their affiliates can convert their traf-
fic into installations, without investing in their own drive-by
infrastructure.
We also analyze the hosting infrastructure. We find that
to sustain long-lived multi-server operations, in the presence
of increasing pressure from defenders, miscreants are turn-
ing to the cloud. Over 60 % of the exploit servers belong
to cloud hosting services. Long-lived operations are using
pools of exploit servers, distributed among different coun-
tries and autonomous systems (ASes) for resiliency, replac-
ing dead servers with clones. Miscreants are taking advantage
of a booming cloud hosting services market where hosting
is cheap, i.e., virtual private servers (VPS) start at $10 per
month and dedicated servers at $60 [26]. These services are
easy to contract (e.g., automated sign-up procedures requir-
ing only a valid credit card), and short leases are available
(e.g., daily billing) so that the investment loss if the exploit
server is taken down can be less than a dollar. In this envi-
ronment, cloud hosting providers have started reporting that
50 % of their automated VPS subscriptions are being abused
[29].
In addition, we analyze the exploits used by the moni-
tored exploit servers. In particular, we measure the exploit
polymorphism, which as far as we know has not previously
been studied. Our results show that different exploit types
(e.g., Java, PDF, Windows fonts) exhibit different repack-
ing rates. For example, some exploit kits like BlackHole
2 have integrated automated repacking of PDF exploits for
each exploitation attempt. On the opposite side, font exploits
are not being repacked likely due to the lack of repacking
tools. Exploits for Java vulnerabilities are repacked at a lower
and varying frequency indicating that the repacking tool is
likely invoked manually and not fully integrated in the exploit
kit.
To understand how difficult is to takedown exploit servers,
we issue abuse reports for 19 long-lived servers. We analyze
the abuse reporting process, as well as the interaction with
the ISPs and hosting providers. We use our infrastructure to
monitor the result of the report (i.e., whether the server is
taken down). The results are disheartening. Over 61 % of the
reports do not produce a reply and the average life of a exploit
server after it is reported is 4.3 days.
Our work reveals a growing problem for the takedown
of drive-by download operations. While miscreants enjoy
a booming hosting market that enables them to setup new
exploit servers quickly, defenders face a tough time reporting
abuse due to uncooperative providers and inadequate busi-
ness procedures. Takedown procedures need to be rethought.
There is a need to raise the cost for miscreants of a server
being taken down, monitor short-lived VPS subscriptions,
and shift the focus to prosecuting the organizations that run
the operations, as well as the organizations behind special-
ized underground services supporting the ecosystem.
Finally, this work has produced a dataset that includes the
malware binaries we collected, the metadata of when and how
it was collected, and the malware classification results. To
foster further research, we make our Maliciadataset avail-
able to other researchers [27].
Contributions:
– We propose a technique to identify drive-by operations by
grouping exploit servers based on their configuration and

















Fig. 1 Exploit kit ecosystem
– We report on aspects of drive-by operations such as the
number of servers they use, their hosting infrastructure,
their lifetime, and the malware families they distribute.
– We measure the polymorphism of the exploits served by
the monitored exploit servers.
– We analyze the abuse reporting procedure by sending
reports on exploit servers.
– We build a dataset with the collected malware, their clas-
sification, and associated metadata. We make this dataset
available to other researchers.
2 Overview
Drive-by downloads are a popular malware distribution vec-
tor. To distribute its products over drive-by downloads, a mal-
ware owner needs three items: exploitation software, servers,
and traffic. To facilitate the process, three specialized services
exist (Fig. 1). A malware owner can license an exploit kit
(host-it-yourself), rent a exploit server with the exploit kit
installed (exploitation-as-a-service), or simply buy installs
from a pay-per-install service that provides the exploit server
and the traffic.
2.1 Roles
The exploit kit ecosystem has four main roles: malware
owner, exploit kit developer, exploit server owner, and exploit
server manager. Exploit kit developers offer a software kit
including a set of exploits for different platforms (i.e., com-
bination of browser, browser plugins, and OS), web pages
to exploit visitors and drop files on their hosts, a database to
store all information, and an administration panel to con-
figure the functionality and provide installation statistics.
Exploit kits are offered through two licensing models: host-it-
yourself (HIY) and exploitation-as-a-service (EaaS). In both
models, access to the exploit kit (or server) is time limited
and clients obtain free software updates during this time.
Also in both models, the client provides the traffic as well as
a domain name to which the kit is linked. The client pays for
domain changes (e.g., $20 for BlackHole [58]) unless it buys
a more expensive multi-domain license.
The exploit server provider is the entity that contracts the
hosting and Internet connectivity for the exploit server. It
can be the malware owner in the HIY model or the exploit
kit developer in EaaS. Exploit kits are designed to be installed
on a single host that contains the exploits, malware files, con-
figuration, and statistics. Thus, exploit servers are typically
dedicated, rather than compromised, hosts. A robust hosting
infrastructure is needed to launch long-lived operations as
most exploit servers are short lived. Exploit server providers
acquire a pool of servers and favor hosting providers and ISPs
where exploit servers live longer, i.e., those that are not dili-
gent in handling abuse reports, or those who offer a specific
abuse protection policy.
The exploit server manager is the entity that manages the
exploit server through its administration panel. The manager
is a client of the exploit kit developer and corresponds to the
malware owner or a PPI service. PPI affiliate programs may
run their own exploit server providing each affiliate with a
unique affiliate URL. Affiliates credit installs by installing
their affiliate-specific malware executable in hosts they have
compromised, or by sending traffic to their affiliate URL,
which would in turn install their affiliate-specific malware
if exploitation succeeds. In these programs, affiliates can
point their traffic sources to their affiliate URL in the pro-
gram’s exploit server or to their own exploit server. The lat-
ter requires investment, but has two advantages: They can
configure their exploit server to install other malware on the
compromised machine, and they can avoid the affiliate pro-
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gram skimming part of their traffic for their own purposes.
Our operation analysis reveals both exploit servers managed
by individual affiliates and by PPI affiliate programs.
2.2 Exploit server clustering
In this work, we cluster exploit servers under the same man-
agement using information about the server’s configuration.
Two servers sharing configuration, (e.g., pointed by the same
domain, hosting similar URLs, using the same exploits, or
distributing the same malware) indicates that they may be
managed by the same organization. We focus on server con-
figuration because the software is identical in many exploit
servers since kit updates are free and promptly applied (19
days after the launch of BlackHole 2.0, we could no longer
find any live BlackHole 1.x servers).
Our results show that attackers are using pools of exploit
servers to sustain malware distribution operations over time.
Such operations often run multiple exploit servers simultane-
ously behind a traffic direction system (TDS) that distributes
the incoming traffic among them [25]. When one of their
exploit servers goes down, attackers replace it with another
server from their pool. The intuition behind our clustering is
that in this environment, new exploit servers often reuse the
configuration of older servers. This happens because, when
installing a new exploit server, the attacker simply clones an
existing server including its configuration, e.g., by uploading
to a new cloud hosting provider a previously created virtual
machine image file where an exploit server is installed and
configured.
3 Methodology
To collect the information needed to cluster servers into oper-
ations, we have built an infrastructure to track individual
exploit servers over time, periodically collecting and classi-
fying the malware they distribute. Our pipeline is described
in Fig. 2. We receive feeds of drive-by download URLs
(Sect. 3.1), use honeyclients as well as specialized milkers
to periodically collect the malware from the exploit servers
those URLs direct to (Sect. 3.2), classify malware using icon
information and behavioral reports obtained through execu-
tion in a contained environment (Sect. 3.3), store all informa-
tion in a database, and use the collection and classification
data for clustering exploit servers into operations (Sect. 4)
and for abuse reporting (Sect. 5). An earlier version of the
milking and classification components was used to collect the
BlackHole/Phoenix feed in [19]. Since that work, we have
upgraded those two components. This section describes their
latest architecture, detailing the differences with [19].
3.1 Feeds
To identify exploit servers for the first time, we use two pub-
licly available feeds: Malware Domain List (MDL) [28] and
urlQuery [51]. MDL provides a public forum where contrib-
utors report and discuss malicious URLs. The reported URLs
are manually checked by volunteers. Once verified, they are
published through their webpage and feeds. urlQuery is an
automatic service that receives URLs submitted by analysts
and publishes the results of visiting those URLs on their
webpage. We periodically scan the webpages of MDL and
urlQuery for URLs matching our own regular expressions
for the landing URLs of common exploit kits. The volume
of URLs in urlQuery is much larger than in MDL, but the
probability of finding a live exploit server is larger in MDL
because URLs in urlQuery are not verified to be malicious
and URLs long dead are often re-reported. We selected these
feeds based on their public availability, but the infrastructure
is designed to work with any URL feed.
3.2 Milking
Our milking component differs from the one used to col-
lect the BlackHole/Phoenix feed in [19] in that it identifies
an exploit server by its landing IP, i.e., the IP address host-
ing the landing URL, which provides the functionality (typ-
ically some obfuscated JavaScript code) to select the appro-
priate exploits for the victim’s platform. In [19], we identified
exploit servers by the domain in their URLs. This was prob-
lematic because a large number of domains often resolve to
the IP address of an exploit server. When the domains in the
URLs known to us went down, our milking would consider
the exploit server dead, even if it could still be reachable
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Fig. 2 Architecture of our milking, classification, and analysis
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ing URLs of a server stop resolving, the milking queries two
passive DNS services [6,44] for alternative domains recently
observed resolving to the exploit server. If no alternative
domain is found, the milking continues using the landing
IP.
In addition, our infrastructure now resolves the mali-
cious domains periodically, which enables locating previ-
ously unknown exploit servers if the same domain is used to
direct traffic to different exploit servers over time. This infor-
mation is used in our clustering (Sect. 4). Using this separate
resolution, we discover an additional 69 servers not present
in our feeds and another 30 servers before they appear in the
feeds.
Another difference is that in [19], we relied exclusively
on lightweight specialized milkers, i.e., custom HTTP clients
that collect the malware from the exploit server, without run-
ning a browser or going through the exploitation process,
simply by replaying a minimized network dialog of a suc-
cessful exploitation. Our specialized milkers take advantage
of the lack of replay protection in the BlackHole 1.x and
Phoenix exploit kits. For details on the construction of the
specialized milkers, we refer the interested reader to our tech-
nical report [40]. Since then we have added support for milk-
ing other exploit kits by adding honeyclients, i.e., Windows
virtual machines installed with an unpatched browser (and
browser plugins), which can be navigated to a given landing
URL [30,54].
Milking policy. Our milking tries to download malware from
each known exploit server every hour on average. If no mal-
ware is collected, it increments a failure counter for the
exploit server. If a failure counter reaches a threshold of six,
the state of its exploit server is changed to offline. If mal-
ware is collected before 6 h, its failure counter is reset. This
allows milking to continue through temporary failures of the
exploit server. In addition, the milking component runs a
separate process that checks if an offline exploit server has
resurrected every two days. If three consecutive resurrection
checks fail, the exploit server is considered dead. If the server
has resurrected, its failure and resurrection counters are reset.
3.3 Malware classification
Our classification process leverages icon information
extracted statically from the binary as well as network traf-
fic and screenshots obtained by executing the malware in
a contained environment. Compared with the classification
process in [19], we propose the automated clustering of mal-
ware icons and screenshots using perceptual hashing and
have implemented a novel malware clustering and signature
generation tool [39]. In addition, we evaluate the accuracy
of the icon and screenshot clustering using a manually gen-
erated ground truth.
(a) winwebsec (b) securityshield   (c) zbot
Fig. 3 Icon polymorphism. Each pair of icons comes from two differ-
ent files of the same family and is perceptually the same, although each
icon has a different hash
Additional behavioral features could be used for malware
classification such as the system and API calls invoked by
the malware during execution [4,5]. We have not yet added
those due to resource constraints. Their addition would likely
increase our malware classification results. However, our cur-
rent classification only leaves 2 % of the malware samples
unclassified, so the benefit would be limited.
Malware execution. We execute each binary in a virtualized
environment designed to capture the network traffic the mal-
ware produces and to take a screenshot of the guest VM at
the end of the execution. We use Windows XP Service Pack
3 as the guest OS and only allow DNS traffic and HTTP con-
nections to predefined benign sites to leave our contained
environment. All other traffic is redirected to internal sinks.
Our classification applies automatic clustering techniques
separately to the icons, the screenshots, and the network traf-
fic. Then, an analyst manually refines the generic labels by
comparing cluster behaviors against public reports. Finally,
majority voting on the icon, screenshot, and network labels
decide the family label for an executable.
Icons. A Windows executable can embed an icon in its header.
Many malware families use icons because it makes them look
benign and helps them establish a brand, which is important
for some malware classes such as rogue software. Icons can
be extracted statically from the binary without running the
executable, so feature extraction is very efficient. A naive
icon feature would simply compute the hash of the icon. How-
ever, some malware families use polymorphism to obfuscate
the icons in their executables, so that two malware of the same
family has icons that look the same to the viewer, but have dif-
ferent hashes (Fig. 3). To capture such polymorphic icon vari-
ants, we use a perceptual hash function [60]. Perceptual hash
functions are designed to produce similar hashes for images
that are perceptually (i.e., visually) similar. A good percep-
tual hash returns similar hashes for two images if one is a
version of the other that has suffered transformations such as
scaling, aspect ratio changes, or small changes in brightness,
contrast, and color. We have experimented with two different
perceptual hash functions: average hash (avgHash) [23] and
pHash [60]. We use the Hamming distance between hashes
as our distance metric. If the distance is less than a thresh-
old, both icons are clustered together using the aggressive
algorithm in Sect. 4.2. We experimentally select the thresh-
old value for each feature. Table 1 (top) shows the clustering
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Table 1 Clustering results for icons (top) and screenshots (bottom)
Feature Th. Clus. Precision (%) Recall (%) Time
I avgHash 3 141 99.7 91.3 2.4 s
I pHash 13 149 99.8 89.6 1 m17 s
S avgHash 1 64 99.2 60.4 7 m37 s
S pHash 13 43 97.9 52.4 16 m8 s
results on 5,777 icons compared with the manually gener-
ated ground truth, which an analyst produces by examining
the clusters. The results show very good precision for both
features and slightly better recall and runtime for avgHash.
Screenshots. The screenshot clustering also uses perceptual
hashing. Table 1 (bottom) shows the clustering results on
9,896 screenshots. This time avgHash achieves better pre-
cision, but slightly worse recall. The lower recall compared
with the icons is due to the perceptual hashing distinguishing
error windows that include different text or the icon of the
executable. Still, the clustering reduces 9,896 screenshots
to 50–60 clusters with very high precision, so it becomes
easy for an analyst to manually label the clusters. We ignore
clusters that capture generic error windows or do not provide
family information, e.g., the Windows firewall prompting the
user to allow some unspecified traffic.
Network traffic. Our network clustering has evolved over
time. In our earlier works [19,32], the features used by the
network clustering were the C&C domains contacted by the
malware and tokens extracted from the URLs and User-Agent
headers in HTTP requests sent by the malware. Those fea-
tures did not handle malware using non-HTTP traffic for
C&C communication. To support non-HTTP C&C traffic,
we developed a novel malware clustering and signature gen-
eration tool called FIRMA [39].
FIRMA takes as input a set of network traces obtained
by running unlabeled malware binaries in a contained envi-
ronment. It outputs: (1) a clusters file with a partition of the
malware binaries that produced the network traces into family
clusters, (2) a signature file with network signatures anno-
tated with the family cluster they correspond to, and (3) an
endpoints file with the C&C domains and IP addresses that
the malware binaries in each family cluster contacted across
the input network traces.
The network signatures produced by FIRMAenable clas-
sifying new executables from previously seen malware
families efficiently, without having to re-run the clus-
tering. More importantly, they can be used to identify
malware-infected computers in network monitored by an
IDS. FIRMAproduces network signatures in the format sup-
ported by the open source signature-matching IDSes Snort
[47] and Suricata [49], so that those popular IDSes can be
used to match the signatures on network traffic.
In addition to not being limited to any type of traffic (e.g.,
HTTP) or specific fields (e.g., HTTP URL, User-Agent),
other salient characteristics of FIRMAare that it produces
a set of network signatures for each malware family (i.e.,
family cluster) and that the signature generation is protocol-
aware. A set of signatures is produced for each family cluster
so that each signature captures a different network behavior
of the family, e.g., one signature for HTTP traffic and another
for a binary C&C protocol or different signatures for different
protocol messages. Using a protocol-aware traffic clustering
and signature generation means that if the C&C traffic uses
a known application protocol such as HTTP, IRC, or SMTP,
the traffic is parsed into fields and the signatures capture that
a token may be specific to a field and should only be matched
on that field, increasing signature accuracy.
It is important to note that FIRMA supports obfuscated
C&C protocols, commonly used by malware. In fact, much
of the malware in our datasets uses such obfuscation. It is
still possible to generate signatures on those because obfus-
cated C&C protocols often contain value invariants. For fully
polymorphic C&C protocols [42], i.e., protocols where every
single byte changes in each request making it impossible to
generate a signature on the ciphertext, FIRMAcan still clus-
ter malware samples from the same family if they reuse the
same C&C domains or IP addresses. We refer the reader to
the FIRMApaper for more details [39].
Once FIRMAoutputs the family clusters, an analyst tries
to map the automatically generated cluster labels (e.g.,
CLUSTER:A) to well-known traffic families (e.g., zbot).
Overall, our classification produces traffic labels for 80 %
executables, icon labels for 51 %, and screenshot labels for
21 %. It classifies 93 % of the executables, 5 % fail to execute,
and 2 % remain unclassified.
3.4 Exploit analysis
An exploit is an input to a program that takes advantage of
a software vulnerability, which affects some versions of the
program, to cause an unintended behavior of the program. An
exploit is able to drive the program execution to the vulnera-
bility point where the vulnerability can be triggered (e.g., an
arithmetic operation) and to trigger the vulnerability condi-
tion (e.g., make the arithmetic operation overflow).
Similar to malware, exploits can also exhibit polymor-
phism. That is, the same exploit can be repacked multiple
times to generate different exploit instances, i.e., variants of
the same exploit. For example, a PDF exploit, in addition to
the data that lead the program to the vulnerability point and
triggers the vulnerability condition, may also contain much
other data that can be modified to generate a different PDF
file that still exploits the same vulnerability in the same way.
In this example, we say that the old and new PDF files are
two instances of the same exploit.
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Exploit polymorphism can be introduced by exploit kit
developers to bypass exploit signatures used by AV vendors.
It also happens when the payload of the exploit (e.g., the
code run after exploitation and the data used by that code)
needs to be updated, without affecting how the vulnerabil-
ity is exploited. For example, an exploit may embed URLs
from where some malware is downloaded after exploitation.
Those URLs may need to be changed periodically to bypass
URL blacklists. Every time they are changed, a new exploit
instance is created.
In this section, we perform what we believe is the first
analysis of how exploit polymorphism works in prevalent
exploit kits. In particular, we examine how often different
exploit types (e.g., Java, PDF, Windows fonts) are repacked
to introduce polymorphism.
Exploit collection. To analyze the exploits used in the drive-
by downloads, we leverage that (starting on November 19,
2012) every time a honeyclient visits a potentially malicious
URL, a trace of the complete network communication is
stored. This produces 14,505 network traces, of which 19.7 %
correspond to exploitation attempts. The rest corresponds
to landing URLs that no longer lead to an exploit server,
or exploit servers temporarily down. Of those exploitation
attempts 74.5 % (14.7 % of all network traces) lead to mal-
ware installation. The unsuccessful exploitation attempts
may be due to unreliable exploits and, rarely, to the honey-
client execution finishing before malware was downloaded.
The collected exploits come from the BlackHole 2.x (BH2)
and CoolExploit exploit kits. For other exploit kits, for which,
we use milkers, e.g., Phoenix and BlackHole 1.x, no network
traces are generated.
The network traces contain multiple instances of the
exploits that the exploit servers use against our honeyclients.
Extracting and classifying all exploit instances in a network
trace are challenging. We focus on exploits that are individual
files, namely Java JAR archives, PDF documents, and EOT
font files. There may be other types of exploits embedded in
the landing page, e.g., JavaScript exploits. We do not attempt
to identify and classify those because the landing page is
obfuscated and while it could be deobfuscated, understand-
ing what parts of it correspond to an exploit is difficult, as the
landing page contains additional functionality like checking
the victim’s software configuration and redirecting the user
after exploitation. We extract a total of 172 unique (by SHA1
hash) exploit instances: 114 JAR, 55 PDF, and 3 EOT files.
The JAR and PDF files target vulnerabilities in the Java and
Adobe Reader browser plugins, respectively, and the EOT
files target Windows vulnerabilities.
Exploit kits select which exploits to use from their exploit
pool based on the software configuration of the victim, typi-
cally checked by some JavaScript code in the landing page.
Thus, the exploits in our network traces depend on the config-
uration of our honeyclients. Our honeyclients have the same
configuration: Windows XP SP3 with IE 7, Java JRE 6u14,
and Adobe Reader 8. It is important to note that our goal
is not to analyze all the exploits that a exploit kit contains.
Our approach cannot see exploits that exploit servers do not
serve against our honeyclients. For example, the BlackHole
and CoolExploit kits are known to contain Flash exploits [3].
However, we do not observe Flash exploits in our network
traces, likely because our honeyclients do not have Flash
installed; thus, the exploit kits do not serve those exploits.
Rather, our goal is to analyze a novel question: Whether
exploit kits periodically repack their exploits and if so, how
often.
Exploit classification. To verify that the extracted files are
exploits, we leverage two online services: VirusTotal [52]
and Wepawet [55]. We use VirusTotal for JAR and EOT files
and Wepawet for PDF files, as VirusTotal does not support
PDF files. The three EOT files and 112/114 JAR files were
present in VirusTotal and flagged by at least one AV vendor
to be malicious. We submitted to VirusTotal the two JAR
files that they had not seen yet, which were both flagged as
malicious. We submit all 55 PDF documents to Wepawet,
which identifies them as exploits. Thus, all extracted files are
indeed exploits, which shows that the file extraction from the
network traces does not identify benign files as exploits.
We classify the exploits according to the vulnerability they
target. We first submit the exploit files to VirusTotal, which
scans them using a variety of AV products and publishes
the AV detection labels. We leverage the fact that some AV
vendors include the CVE identifier of the vulnerability in
their labels. For each AV that detects the file as malicious,
we check if a CVE identifier is included in the detection
label using the following regular expression: CVE[-_]?([0-
9]{4})[-_]+([0-9]{4}). Different AV vendors may not agree
on the vulnerability targeted by the exploit. To address this
issue, we use majority voting to select the most commonly
seen CVE identifier for a exploit file. In case of a tie, we
choose the most frequent CVE identifier between the tied
ones, where frequency is computed across all exploits that
present no tie. For the PDF files, Wepawet outputs a single
CVE for each exploit, so majority voting is not needed.
Using AV labels for classification is not ideal as it is
well known that AV vendors focus on detection and their
classification is often inaccurate [4]. Indeed, we found two
exploit instances where AV vendors disagreed on the tar-
geted vulnerability, and the majority voting was wrong. In
this case, it was possible to spot the error because the vul-
nerabilities output by the majority voting did not affect the
Java versions run by our honeyclients. These examples illus-
trate the need for developing accurate exploit classification
techniques.
Table 2 presents the exploit classification results. For each
exploit type, it shows the CVE identifier of the different vul-
nerabilities or Unknown if no CVE identifiers were found. For
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Table 2 Exploit classification
Type CVE Instances Collected Ratio (%)
JAR CVE-2012-0507 88 2,419 3.5
CVE-2012-1723 15 203 7.4
CVE-2010-4476 3 103 2.9
Unknown 8 158 5.0
Subtotal 114 2,894 3.9
EOT CVE-2011-3402 3 777 0.3
PDF CVE-2009-0927 43 47 91.4
CVE-2010-0188 12 12 100
Subtotal 55 69 93.2
Total 172 3,740 4.6
each vulnerability, it presents the number of unique exploit
files labeled with that vulnerability, the total number of times
those instances appears in the network traces, and the ratio
of both numbers as a percentage. The larger the percentage
the more likely it is that when we collect a exploit instance
for a vulnerability, we have never seen that instance before.
The results show that Java vulnerabilities are most targeted
against our honeyclients, followed by the CVE-2011-3402
TrueType font parsing vulnerability in Windows, with PDF
exploits comprising only 1.8 % of all exploits used against
our honeyclients. The most common Java vulnerability is
CVE-2012-0507, which is targeted by 65 % of the collected
exploits. As explained earlier, if we configured our honey-
clients differently, exploit kits may serve them other exploits.
Exploit polymorphism. We analyze whether exploit kits have
integrated packing tools to automatically provide polymor-
phism for their exploits. For this, we analyze each exploit file
type (JAR, PDF, EOT) separately. For PDF files, the ratio in
Table 2 shows that 93.2 % of the times that we collect a PDF
exploit instance it is new, i.e., we have not collected it before.
This indicates high polymorphism as we periodically visit
each exploit server until it dies, indicating that the same server
distributes different exploit instances for the same vulnerabil-
ity over time. A detailed analysis of PDF exploit distribution
reveals 11 BlackHole 2.0 (BH2) servers distributing PDF
exploits. Consecutive visits to the same BH2 exploit server,
separated by as little as 4 min, yield different PDF exploits
for the same vulnerability. In addition, when we collect mul-
tiple instances of the same PDF exploit, all the instances
appear in a single network trace (i.e., on the same drive-by
download session). These indicate that automatic repacking
of PDF exploits is likely integrated into the BH2 exploit kit
and occurs for every drive-by download session. This means
that byte signatures are unlikely to help in detecting PDF
exploits.
In contrast, the ratio for EOT exploits is very low (0.3 %),






















Fig. 4 CDF of the lifetime of Java exploits
EOT files shows that of the three files, one is served by the
CoolExploit kit and the other two by different operations that
use BH2. Each exploit instance uses a different URL to down-
load the malware after exploitation and is never repacked,
i.e., BH2 and CoolExploit servers always distribute the same
EOT exploit instance over time. For example, the longest
lived server in our dataset distributes the same EOT exploit
for over two months. This likely indicates that there are no
repacking tools available for EOT exploits. Once an EOT
exploit is created with an embedded URL, attackers need to
ensure that the URL stays up over long periods of time, e.g.,
by using bullet-proof hosting. This produces an easy avenue
for detection. We expect that in the near future repacking
tools will become available due to market demand or that
EOT exploits will be replaced by easier to repack exploit
types.
The ratio for JAR exploit instances is 3.9 % indicating
some polymorphism, but much lower than PDF exploits. Fig-
ure 4 shows the CDF of the lifetime of JAR exploit instances,
where the lifetime of an instance is measured as the differ-
ence between the last and first time it was collected. The
median lifetime is 14.4 h, the average is 39.3 h, and the stan-
dard deviation is 121.9 h (i.e., 5 days). In total, 69.2 % of
the exploits have a lifetime less or equal to one day, 19.2 %
have a lifetime between one and two days, and the remaining
more than two days. The high standard deviation in lifetime
and the overall low repacking rate indicate that Java exploits
are not automatically repacked by the monitored exploit kits.
They are likely repacked using tools that need to be manually
invoked by the exploit server manager. These tools may be
shipped (but not integrated) with the exploit kit or may be
commercial-off-the-self (COTS) tools [1,61].
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Fig. 5 Exploit distribution of different vulnerabilities over time
The fact that EOT exploits are not repacked means that dif-
ferent exploit servers in the same operation may deliver the
same EOT exploit instance. In addition, since the repack-
ing of Java exploits requires some manual steps, exploit
server managers are likely to copy the newly packed exploit
instances across their exploit servers. We leverage these to
incorporate exploit polymorphism as one of the features used
in our exploit server clustering, presented in the next section.
Vulnerabilities exploited over time. Figure 5 shows the dis-
tribution over time of the exploits for each vulnerability. Of
the eight vulnerabilities, exploits for five of them were col-
lected from the time we started producing network traces
with the honeyclients. Exploits for the three other vulner-
abilities started to be collected three months later, which
indicates that those vulnerabilities were added later to the
exploit kits. Two of these (CVE-2013-0431 and CVE-2013-
0422) are recent vulnerabilities. This illustrates the benefit of
the exploit kit ecosystem where exploit kit writers focus on
developing exploits for new vulnerabilities, and new exploits
for old ones, and customers achieve improved infection rates
by adding those exploits.
4 Exploit server clustering
To identify exploit servers managed by the same organiza-
tion, we propose an unsupervised clustering approach that
groups exploit servers that have similar exploit kit configu-
rations. The intuition is that exploit servers in the same opera-
tion are more likely to be similarly configured because attack-
ers may reuse parts of the configuration across their servers.
For example, attackers may clone an existing exploit server
to create a new one in a different hosting provider by copying
the image file with the exploit kit configured. Or, they may
use a malicious domain to point to different exploit servers
over time. In contrast, exploit servers in different operations
are less likely to be similarly configured.
To cluster the exploit servers, we define a distance metric
between two exploit servers based on their configuration.
The distance metric combines seven features that capture
how a exploit server is configured including the domains
that point to the server, the server’s IP address, the URLs it
hosts, the exploits it serves, and the malware it distributes.
These features are derived from our milk data.
This section details our seven similarity features (Sect. 4.1)
and the clustering algorithms we use (Sect. 4.2).
4.1 Features
We define seven boolean server similarity features:
1. Landing URL feature: The landing URL of a exploit
server contains elements that are specific to the config-
uration of the exploit kit. In particular, the file path in
the landing URL (the directory where the kit’s files are
installed and the name of those files) and the parameter
values (typically used to differentiate traffic sources) are
configurable and changed from the default by the man-
ager to make it difficult to produce URL signatures for
the kit. This feature first extracts for each landing URL
the concatenation of the file path (including the file name)
and the list of parameter values. The similarity is one if
the set intersection is non-empty, otherwise it is zero.
2. Domain feature:If the same DNS domain has resolved to
the IP addresses of two exploit servers, that is a strong
indication that both exploit servers belong to the same
organization, i.e., the one that owns the domain. This
feature first extracts the set of DNS domains that have
resolved to the IP address of each server. The similarity
between two servers is one if the set intersection is non-
empty, otherwise the similarity is zero.
3. File hash feature: A malware owner can distribute its
malware using its own infrastructure (HIY or EaaS) or a
PPI service. However, it is unlikely that it will use both of
them simultaneously because outsourcing distribution to
a PPI service indicates a willingness to avoid investing in
infrastructure. Thus, if the same malware executable (i.e.,
same SHA1 hash) is distributed by two servers, that is a
strong indication of both exploit servers belonging to the
same organization. This feature first extracts the set of file
hashes milked from each exploit server. The similarity is
one if the set intersection is non-empty, otherwise it is
zero.
4. Icon feature: The icon in a malware executable is selected
by the creator of the executable, i.e., malware owner
or an affiliate PPI program (the program is typically in
charge of repacking the affiliate-specific malware [7]). In
both cases, a shared icon in files distributed by different
servers is a strong indication of both servers distributing
malware from the same owner. This feature is related to
the file hash feature, but covers files that may have been
repacked, while keeping the same icon. This feature first
extracts the set of icons in files milked from each exploit
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server. The similarity is one if the set intersection is larger
than one, otherwise it is zero.
5. Family feature: If two servers distribute the same mal-
ware family, and the malware family is neither a malware
kit (e.g., zbot, spyeye) nor an affiliate program, then the
two servers distribute malware of the same owner and
thus share management. This feature is optional for the
analyst to use because it requires a priori knowledge of
which malware families are malware kits or affiliate pro-
grams, otherwise it may overcluster. This boolean feature
first extracts the set of non-kit, non-affiliate malware fam-
ilies distributed by each exploit server. The similarity is
one if the set intersection is non-empty, otherwise it is
zero.
6. Consecutive IP feature: If two exploit servers have con-
secutive IP addresses that is a strong indicator that both
servers have been contracted by the same entity because
the probability of two separate exploit server owners
selecting the same ISPs and those ISPs selecting con-
secutive IP addresses for their servers is very small. The
similarity between two servers is one if their IP addresses
are consecutive, otherwise it is zero.
7. Exploit hash feature: Similar to malware, exploits may
also be periodically repacked. Such repacking is either
performed on the fly by the exploit kit or manually using
a repacking tool. In both cases, if the same exploit (i.e.,
same SHA1 hash) is distributed by two servers, that is
a strong indication of both exploit servers being man-
aged by the same entity. This feature first extracts the
set of exploit hashes collected from each exploit server.
The similarity is one if the set intersection is non-empty,
otherwise it is zero. Note that exploit types that are
automatically repacked in each exploitation session, e.g.,
PDF exploits, will not capture similarity in this feature
since each exploit server serves different PDF exploit
instances. In our experiments, this feature captures simi-
larity on the Java and EOT exploits only. However, with
other exploit kits, it is unknown a priori whether auto-
matic repacking for a exploit type has been integrated in
the kit. Thus, it is important to include all exploit types
when computing this feature.
4.2 Clustering algorithms
We experiment with two clustering algorithms: The partition-
ing around medoids (PAM) [22] and an aggressive clustering
algorithm that groups any servers with some similarity.
Partitioning around medoids. The input to the PAM algo-
rithm is a distance matrix. To compute this matrix, we com-
bine the server similarity features into a boolean server dis-
tance metric as d(s1, s2) = 1−(∨5i=1 fi (s1, s2)), where fi is
the server similarity feature i . Note that the features compute
similarity (one is similar), while the distance computes dis-
similarity (zero is similar). Once a distance matrix has been
computed, we apply the PAM algorithm. Since PAM takes as
input the number k of clusters to output, the clustering is run
with different k values, selecting the one which maximizes
the Dunn index [16], a measure of clustering quality.
Aggressive clustering. Our aggressive clustering first com-
putes a boolean server similarity metric: Two servers have
similarity one if any of the server feature similarities is one
(logical OR). Then, it iterates on the list of servers and checks
if the current server is similar to any server already in a clus-
ter. If the current server is only similar to servers in the same
cluster, we add the server to that cluster. If it is similar to
servers in multiple clusters, we merge those clusters and add
the current server to the merged cluster. If it is not similar to
any server already in the clusters, we create a new cluster for
it. The complexity of this algorithm is O(n2), but since the
number of servers is on the hundreds, the clustering termi-
nates in a few seconds.
5 Reporting
Reporting abuse is an important part of fighting cybercrime,
largely overlooked by the research community. In this sec-
tion, we briefly describe the abuse reporting process and the
challenges an abuse reporter faces. In Sect. 6.5, we detail our
experiences reporting exploit servers and discuss the current
situation.
Five entities may be involved in reporting an exploit
server: The abuser, the reporter, the hosed that owns the
premises where the exploit server is installed, the abuser’s
ISP that provides Internet access to the exploit server, and
national agencies such as CERTs and law enforcement.
Sometimes, the ISP is also the hoster because it provides
both hosting and Internet access to the exploit server. The
abuser can also be the hoster if it runs the exploit server from
its own premises.
The most common practice for reporting exploit servers
(and many other abuses1), is to first email an abuse report to
the ISP’s abuse handling team, who will forward it to their
customer (i.e., the hoster) if they do not provide the hosting
themselves. If this step fails (e.g., no abuse contact found,
email bounces, no action taken), the reporter may contact the
CERT for the country where the exploit server is hosted or
local law enforcement. There are two main reasons to notify
first the abuser’s ISP. First, in most cases, a reporter does
not know the abuser’s or hoster’s identity. But, the abuser’s
1 This practice also applies to other types of abuse such as C&C servers,
hosts launching SSH and DoS attacks, and malware-infected machines.
However, spam is commonly reported from a receiving mail provider
to the sender mail provider and web server compromises are commonly
first reported to the webmaster.
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ISP is the entity that has been delegated the IP address of
the exploit server, which can be found in the WHOIS data-
bases [15]. Second, ISPs that are provided evidence of an
abuse of their terms of service (ToS) or acceptable use policy
(AUP) by a host unlikely to have been compromised (e.g.,
an exploit server) can takedown the abusing server without
opening themselves to litigation. This removes the need for
law enforcement involvement, speeding the process of stop-
ping the abuse.
Next, we describe three challenges a reporter faces when
sending abuse reports.
Abuse report format and content. The Messaging Abuse
Reporting Format (MARF) [17,18,45] defines the format
and content for spam abuse reports. Unfortunately, it does
not cover other types of abuse and proposals for extending it
(e.g., X-ARF [57]) are still work in progress. In this work, we
use our own email template for reporting exploit servers. The
key question is what information will convince an ISP of the
abuse. The goal is to provide sufficient evidence to convince
the ISP to start its own verification. The key evidence we
include is a network trace of a honeyclient being exploited
by the exploit server. We also include the IP address of the
server, the first day we milked it, and pointers to public feeds
listing the server.
Abuse contact address. Finding the correct abuse contact is
not always easy (or possible). For spam, RFC 6650 states that
abuse reports should only be sent to email addresses clearly
intended to handle abuse reports such as those in WHOIS
records or on a web site of the form abuse@domain [18].
Unfortunately, not all ISPs have an abuse@domain address.
Such addresses are only required for ISPs that (care to)
have an abuse team [12] and have not been mandatory in
WHOIS databases until recently. Even now, they are often
only mandatory for new or updated WHOIS entries and the
objects and attributes holding this information are not con-
sistent across databases. We are able to find abuse addresses
for 86 % of all exploit servers we milk. In practice, reporters
use WHOIS to identify the organization that has been del-
egated the abuser’s IP address. If an abuse email does not
exist for the organization (or cannot be found in its website),
abuse reports are sent to the organization’s technical contact,
which is mandatory in WHOIS. Unfortunately, after finding
an email address to send the report, there is no guarantee on
its accuracy.
Sender’s identity. Abuse reports may end up being received
by malicious organizations (e.g., bullet-proof ISPs or
hosters). Thus, using an individual’s real identity in an abuse
report can be problematic. On the other hand, abuse teams
may be suspicious of pseudonyms. Organizations that issue
many abuse reports such as SpamHaus [50] can rely on their
reputation, but they do not act as abuse aggregators. In this
work, we use a pseudonym to hide our identities and still get
access to the communication with ISPs and hosters.
Table 3 Summary of milking operation
Milking period 2012-03-07–2013-03-25
Malware executables milked 46,514
Unique executables milked 11,363
Domains milked 603
Servers milked 502
ASes hosting servers 242
Countries hosting servers 57
Malware executions 21,765























Fig. 6 CDF of exploit server lifetime
6 Analysis
Table 3 summarizes our milking, which started on March
7, 2012 and has been operating for 12 months (the Black-
Hole/Phoenix dataset in [19] covered only until April 20).
We have milked a total of 502 exploit servers, hosted in 57
countries and 242 ASes, and downloaded from them 46,514
malware executables, of which 11,363 are unique (by SHA1
hash). A total of 603 DNS domains were observed pointing
to the 502 servers.
6.1 Exploit server lifetime
To understand how well defenders are reacting to the drive-by
download threat, we measure the exploit server lifetime, i.e.,
the period of time during which it distributes malware. For
this measurement, we use only exploit servers found after we
updated our infrastructure to identify servers by landing IP
(Sect. 3.2) and remove servers for which we have sent abuse
reports (Sect. 6.5). Figure 6 presents the CDF for the exploit
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server lifetime. The majority of exploit servers are short lived:
13 % live only for an hour, 60 % are dead before one day, and
the median lifetime is 16 h. However, it is worrying to observe
a significant number of long-lived servers: 10 % live more
than a week, 5 % more than two weeks, and some servers
live up to 2.5 months.
The median exploit server lifetime we measure is more
than six times larger than the 2.5 h median lifetime of a exploit
domain (a domain resolving to the landing IP of an exploit
server) measured by Grier et al. using passive DNS data [19].
This shows the importance of identifying exploit servers by
their IP address, accounting for multiple domains pointing
to the same server over time.
6.2 Hosting
In this section, we analyze the hosting infrastructure. We
find that miscreants are abusing cloud hosting services. We
also find, similar to prior work [46,48], autonomous systems
hosting an inordinate number of exploit servers, compared
with the size of their IP space.
Cloud hosting services. Using WHOIS, we can first deter-
mine which organization has been delegated the IP address
of an exploit server and then use web searches to determine
whether it offers cloud hosting services. Our results show
that at least 60 % of the exploit servers belong to cloud host-
ing services, predominantly to Virtual Private Server (VPS)
providers that rent VMs where the renter gets root access.
This number could be larger because ISPs do not always
reveal in WHOIS whether an IP address has been delegated
to a customer, who may be a hosting provider. This indicates
that drive-by operations have already embraced the benefits
of outsourcing infrastructure to the cloud.
AS distribution. Table 4 shows the top ASes by the cumula-
tive uptime (in days) of all exploit servers we milked in the
AS. It also shows the number of exploit servers in the AS, the
CAIDA ranking of the AS by the number of IPv4 addresses
in its customer cone (the lower the ranking the larger the
AS) [8], and the FIRE ranking for malicious ASes [48]. The
two ASes with the largest number of exploit servers are in
Europe, and the average life of an exploit server in those
ASes is 10 days and four days, respectively, well above the
median lifetime of 16 h. Some small ASes host an inordi-
nate number of exploit servers compared with their ranking
such as awas and infiniumhost, both located in Rus-
sia. There are also three ASes in eastern Europe that do not
advertise any IP addresses or no longer exist, which could
indicate that they were setup for such operations. We milked
servers in three ASes that appear in the 2009 FIRE ranking.
Two of them (ovh and leaseweb) appear also among our
top ASes, which indicates that practices at those ASes have
not improved in three years.
Table 4 Top ASes by cumulative exploitation time
ASN Name CC Days up ES AS rank size FIRE
16276 ovh FR 194.84 21 5,623 10
701 uunet US 139.60 1 8 –
44038 swisscom CH 76.8 1 8,496 –
47869 netrouting NL 70.0 18 4,395 –
43637 sol AZ 61.1 1 6,828 –
48716 ps KZ 52.0 1 8,530 –
56964 rmagazin RO 49.5 2 8,337 –
12695 di-net RU 47.6 9 175 –
36992 etisalat EG 47.1 1 1,136 –
197145 infiumhost RU 44.8 8 1,384 –
36444 nexcess.net.l.l.c US 37.4 4 5,798 –
56413 proservis LT 37.1 1 8,553 –
16265 leaseweb NL 36.8 8 3,089 7
58182 kadroviy RU 30.5 3 – –
5577 root LU 28.7 7 1,171 –
40676 psychz US 28.1 5 6,939 –
21788 burst US 27.8 14 3,942 –
28762 awax RU 27.0 15 4,644 –
44784 sitek UA 23.2 1 – –
15971 ecosoft RO 19.1 5 – –
Table 5 Top malware families by number of exploit servers observed
distributing the family
Family Kit ES Files Milk Repack rate
zbot Kit 170 2,168 11,619 18.6
cridex 64 74 2,555 2.8
zeroaccess Aff 21 1,306 3,755 18.0
winwebsec Aff 18 5,820 16,335 59.5
spyeye Kit 11 7 342 2.0
CLUSTER:A 9 14 266 2.2
securityshield 5 150 307 11.8
CLUSTER:B 4 45 51 30.4
CLUSTER:C 4 1 4 1.0
smarthdd 4 68 453 3.1
CLUSTER:D 3 3 32 3.0
CLUSTER:E 3 1 4 1.0
CLUSTER:F 3 9 531 0.7
webprotect 3 3 26 3.9
cleaman 2 32 103 7.7
CLUSTER:G 2 5 148 1.5
CLUSTER:H 2 24 43 21.7
CLUSTER:I 2 9 17 9.4
6.3 Malware families
Our classification has identified a total of 55 families. Table 5
shows the top 18 families sorted by the number of exploit
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Fig. 7 Malware family distribution
servers observed distributing the family. For each family,
Table 5 shows whether the family is a known malware kit or
affiliate program, the number of servers distributing the fam-
ily, the number of unique files milked, the total number of
binaries milked from that family, and its repacking rate. Over-
all, the most widely distributed families are information steal-
ers (zbot, cridex, spyeye), PPI downloaders (zeroaccess),
and rogue software (winwebsec, securityshield, webprotect,
smarthdd). The family most milked was winwebsec, a fake
antivirus affiliate program, while the one distributed through
most servers was zbot, a malware kit for stealing credentials.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of malware families over
time. While most families are distributed through short oper-
ations, there are a few families such as zeroaccess, cridex,
and zbot, which have been distributed throughout most of
our study.
Families with shared ownership. Since different malware
families target different monetization mechanisms, malware
owners may operate different families to maximize income
from compromised hosts. There are 50 servers distributing
multiple malware families. Nine servers distribute different
malware families through the same landing URL, during the
same period of time, and to the same countries, e.g., a visit
from the US with no referer would drop family one, another
visit from the US a few minutes later family two, and then
again family one. This indicates those families share owner-
ship, as there is no way to separate the installs from the differ-
ent families. Some families that manifest shared ownership
are as follows: CLUSTER:D and cleaman, and securityshield
and smarthdd. There is also shared ownership involving fam-
ilies known to be malware kits or affiliate programs such as
winwebsec affiliates installing zbot and CLUSTER:L, and
zbot botmasters installing ramnit.
Repacking rate. Malware owners repack their programs peri-
odically to avoid detection by signature-based AV. On aver-
age, a malware family (excluding kits and affiliate programs)
is repacked 5.4 times a day in our dataset. This is a sharp rise
compared with the 0.1 times a day prior work reported during
August 2010 [7]. This trend will further harm the detection
rate of signature-based AVs. The rightmost column in Table 5
shows the repacking rate for our top families. The rate for
families known to be kits or affiliate programs is artificially
high, covering multiple botnets or affiliates. There are other
families with high repacking rates such as securityshield,
CLUSTER:B, and CLUSTER:H. This could indicate that
those families are malware kits or affiliate programs.
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Table 6 Operation clustering results
Alg. Features 1–4 Features 1–5 Features 1–4,6,7 Features 1–7
Clusters Largest Singletons Clusters Largest Singletons Clusters Largest Singletons Clusters Largest Singletons
Agg. 174 64 121 109 142 71 156 86 111 101 195 73
PAM 256 31 188 204 31 141 294 31 229 261 34 199
6.4 Operations analysis
In this section, we evaluate our clustering approach to iden-
tify operations that use multiple exploit servers. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have ground truth available to evaluate our
clustering results in a quantitative fashion. In fact, if such
ground truth was available, then there would be no need for
the clustering. Instead, we argue qualitatively that our cluster-
ing identifies meaningful and interesting drive-by operations.
Table 6 summarizes the clustering results. It compares the
clustering results with both algorithms and using four differ-
ent feature sets. The two leftmost feature sets (Features 1–4
and 1–5) correspond to the ones used in our prior work [32],
while the two rightmost feature sets correspond to adding the
new features on consecutive IP addresses and exploit poly-
morphism. For the new feature sets, we include the clustering
results with and without the family feature for comparison.
However, for the operation analysis below, we focus on the
results without the family feature (Features 1–4, 6, 7), since
we suspect some families like securityshield to be affiliate
programs. Since those are distributed alongside other mal-
ware, the family feature can overcluster. For each clustering
algorithm and feature set, the table shows the number of
clusters, the size of the largest cluster, and the number of sin-
gleton clusters with only one server. As expected, the aggres-
sive algorithm groups the most, minimizing the number of
clusters.
We first present a number of operations our clustering
reveals (for the aggressive clustering with six features unless
otherwise noted), evaluating their correctness with informa-
tion not used by our features such as which kit was installed
in the exploit server and for affiliate programs, which affili-
ate a malware executable belongs to (we extract the affiliate
identifier from the network traffic). Finally, we summarize
the types of operations the clustering reveals and their distri-
bution properties including the number of servers used, their
hosting, and the operation lifetime.
Phoenix operation. Using both PAM and aggressive, all 21
Phoenix servers are grouped in the same cluster, which exclu-
sively distributes zbot. Here, the clustering reveals that the
Phoenix servers belong to the same operation without using
any features about the exploit kit. Both algorithms do not
include servers from other kits in the cluster, so they are not
overclustering.
Reveton operation. We observe two clusters exclusively dis-
tributing the Reveton ransomware, which locks the computer
with fake police advertisements. One cluster has 14 Cool-
Exploit servers, the other three CoolExploit and one Black-
Hole 2.0. This agrees with external reports on the Reveton
gang switching from BlackHole to the newer CoolExploit kit
[14]. Here, the clustering captures an operation using differ-
ent exploit kits, but possibly underclusters as both clusters
likely belong to the same operation.
Winwebsec operation. We observe the winwebsec fake AV
affiliate program distributed through 22 different servers in
eight clusters. There exists three singleton clusters, each
exclusively distributing the winwebsec executable of a dif-
ferent affiliate. Another cluster of eight servers distributes
affiliate 60830 as well as another unknown malware family
and zbot. The other four clusters distribute the executables
of multiple affiliates. Here, there exist two possibilities: The
same group could have signed up to the winwebsec program
multiple times as different affiliates, or the affiliate program
is managing the exploit server so that affiliates can convert
their traffic into installs. To differentiate between both cases,
we check their landing URLs. One of these clusters uses the
same landing URL to distribute the executables of affiliates
66801, 66802, and 66803. In this case, there is no way to sep-
arate the installs due to each affiliate, which indicates those
affiliates belong to the same entity. The other three clusters
use different landing URLs for each affiliate, which indicates
those servers are run by the affiliate program, which provides
a distinct landing URL to each affiliate.
We confirm that the winwebsec program manages their
own exploit servers through external means. We leverage
a vulnerability on old versions of BlackHole, where the
malware URLs used a file identifier that was incremented
sequentially, and thus could be predicted. On March 12, we
tried downloading file identifiers sequentially from one of
the servers distributing multiple winwebsec affiliates. We
found 114 distinct executables, of which 108 were winweb-
sec executables for different affiliates, one did not execute,
and the other five corresponded to other malware families,
including smarthdd and the Hands-up ransomware [59]. This
indicates that on March 12, the winwebsec program had
108 affiliates and that the winwebsec managers, in addi-




Zeroaccess operations. Zeroaccess is also an affiliate pro-
gram [56]. With the aggressive algorithm, there are eight
clusters distributing zeroaccess: five distribute a single affili-
ate identifier, the other three multiple. For two of these three,
the distribution is simultaneous and on a different landing
URL for each affiliate, which indicates that the zeroaccess
affiliate program also manages their own exploit server. The
other distributes two affiliate identifiers on the same URL,
indicating those affiliates belong to the same entity.
Zbot operations. There are 51 clusters distributing zbot in the
aggressive clustering. Of these, 38 clusters distribute exclu-
sively zbot, the largest using 21 servers over six days. For
each of these 38 clusters, we compute the set of C&C domains
contacted by the malware milked from servers in the clus-
ter. Only three of the 38 clusters have C&C overlap, which
indicates that our non-family features capture enough shared
configuration to differentiate operations distributing the same
malware kit.
Broken malware operation. We identify a cluster with 13
servers that operates on a single day and distributes a sin-
gle file. Surprisingly, the file does not execute. Apparently,
the malware owners realized the malware was corrupt and
stopped the operation.
Operations summary. The clustering reveals two types of
operations. Two-thirds of the clusters are singletons. They
correspond to small operations with one server that lives
on average 14 h. Most singletons distribute a single fam-
ily, which is often zbot or one of the generic families for
which we have not found a published name. The remaining
is operations that leverage multiple servers for their distri-
bution. Multi-server operations use on average 6.2 servers
and diversify their hosting. On average, each multi-server
operation hosts 1.2 servers per country, and two servers per
AS. Multi-server operations last longer with a median life of
5.5 days and only 1.2 servers operate on the same day. This
indicates that they are replacing servers over time to sus-
tain distribution, rather than using them for sudden bursts of
installs (although we observe bursts like the broken malware
operation mentioned earlier).
Feature set comparison. We compare the feature sets in our
prior work [32] with the new feature sets, which add the con-
secutive IP addresses and exploit hash features. With aggres-
sive clustering, the new features reduce the number of clusters
and increase the average cluster size, while with PAM the two
new features further separate the clusters, slightly increasing
their number. With aggressive clustering, the exploit hash
feature is most helpful, merging 13 small clusters into the
largest cluster (86 servers). To verify that indeed the exploit
hash feature is capturing exploit servers that share manage-
ment, we analyze the time distribution of the exploit instances
that are served by multiple servers, finding that their distribu-
tion happens very close in time. This supports our hypothesis
that once the exploits are repacked by the managers, they are
distributed to the different exploit servers in the operation.
The consecutive IP addresses feature merges five old clus-
ters into two new clusters. These new clusters correspond
to operations distributing zbot and cridex. The new clusters
show that the miscreants are running 4–6 servers in the same
cloud hosting provider, with all exploit servers using con-
secutive IPs. This indicates that if a cloud hosting server is
abused the miscreants may install multiple servers in that
hosting provider.
6.5 Reporting analysis
We started sending abuse reports on September 3, 2012 for
exploit servers that we had been milking for 24 h. Most abuse
reports did not produce any reply. Of the 19 reports we sent,
we only received a reply in seven; 61 % of the reports were
not acknowledged. For two of the ISPs, we were unable to
locate an abuse@domain address in WHOIS. One of these
had no technical support contact either, so we resorted to
web searches to find an email address. The absence of an
abuse@domain address indicates a lack of interest in abuse
reports. As expected, those reports did not produce a reply.
All initial replies contained a ticket number, to be included
in further communications about the incident. Three of them
also provided a URL for a ticket tracking system. Two of
the replies came from ISPs to whom we had sent more than
one report (on different dates). Surprisingly, only one of the
two reports produced a reply. This lack of consistency indi-
cates manual processing and that the response to an incident
may depend on the abuse team member that first reviews the
report.
After reporting a server, we keep milking it to understand
how long it takes to act on a report. Note that, these reaction
times are lower bounds because the servers could have been
reported earlier by other parties. On average, an exploit server
lives 4.3 days after a report. Exploit servers whose report did
not generate a response lived on average for 5.1 days after our
report. Servers whose report produced a reply lived for 3.0
days. Thus, the probability of action being taken on the report
when no reply is received is significantly smaller. Next, we
detail the reactions to the seven reports with replies.
Report 1. The most positive report. The exploit server was a
VPS hosted by the ISP, which immediately disconnected it
and notified us of the action (which we confirmed).
Report 2. This large US ISP replied with an automated email
stating that they take abuse reports seriously, but cannot
investigate or respond to each of them. No further reply was
received, and the server lived for four days.
Report 3. A ticket was open with medium priority promising
further notification. No further response was received, and
the server lived for another day.
Report 4. The report was forwarded to a customer. After a
day, the server was still alive so we sent a second report
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stating that the customer had not taken action and the ISP
proceeded to disconnect the server.
Report 5. The report was forwarded to a customer, and our
ticket closed without waiting for the customer’s action. The
server was still alive for 1.7 days.
Report 6. The reply stated they would try to get back within
24 h and definitely before 72 h. The server lived two more
hours, and we never heard back.
Report 7. The initial reply stated that it was a customer’s
server and that according to the Dutch Notice and Take-
down Code of Conduct [31], we had to notify the customer
directly. Only if the customer did not reply after five days, or
their reply was unsatisfactory, we could escalate it to them.
We reported it to the client and after five days the server
was still alive. We re-reported the exploit server to the ISP
who told us to contact the customer again, which we did
copying the ISP. This time the customer replied, but was not
willing to act on the response unless we reveal our real iden-
tity, which we declined. It seems that the ISP called them
requesting the disconnection. The ISP later notified us about
the disconnection. As far as we can tell, the five days waiting
time is not part of the Dutch Notice and Take-down Code of
Conduct.
These reports show that if the exploit server is hosted by a
hosting provider who is a customer of the ISP, the ISP simply
forwards them the abuse report and does no follow-up. It is up
to the reporter to monitor the customer’s action and re-report
to the ISP in case of inaction. They also show how painful
abuse reporting can be and the need for an homogeneous
code of conduct for takedowns.
7 Malicia dataset
To foster future research, e.g., in malware classification, we
have compiled the data collected in this work into the Mali-
ciadataset, which we make available to other researchers.
The Maliciadataset can be requested by researchers at acad-
emia, research laboratories, and industry laboratories fol-
lowing the instructions at the dataset’s webpage [27]. It is
released under an agreement to not redistribute the dataset
and only to researchers under contract from a research insti-
tution. Students need to ask their supervisors to request to
the dataset on their behalf. We use basic identity checks (e.g.,
that the email address from which the request is sent belongs
to the institution requesting it) before releasing the dataset.
At the time of writing, the dataset has been released to 17
institutions: 15 universities and two industrial research lab-
oratories.
This section briefly describes the publicly available 1.0
release of the Maliciadataset. Then, it describes the updates
that we plan to add into release 1.1, which we will make
available upon publication of this manuscript.
7.1 Release 1.0
The current release of the Maliciadataset contains data for
all the milking period (March 7th, 2012–March 25th, 2013).
The dataset comprises five files. The core of the dataset is
a MySQL database with all the milking metadata including
when the malware was collected, from where the malware
was collected, the malware classification, and exploit server
information. In addition, there is a figure that captures the
database schema, a tarball with the malware binaries, another
tarball with the icons extracted from those malware bina-
ries, and a signature file for the Snort IDS produced by our
FIRMA tool.
Database. The database comprises eight tables. The most
important table in the DB is the MILK table, which contains
a row for every time a malware was milked from a exploit
server. Every row contains the timestamp of when the mal-
ware was milked, the landing URL, as well as identifiers
linking to the other DB tables. Other two important tables
are the FILES and LANDING_IP tables. The FILES table
contains a row for each unique malware binary (identified by
SHA1 hash) and its classification information. The LAND-
ING_IP table contains a row for each exploit server (identi-
fied by the landing IP), the exploit kit installed in the server,
the server’s autonomous system number, and its country
code.
Malware. The malware tarball contains 11,363 samples (.exe
and .dll files). For each malware binary, its network traffic,
icon, and screenshot labels, as well as the final family label,
can be found in the FILES table in the DB.
Icons. The icons tarball contains 5,777 icons extracted from
the executables. We provide the icons for convenience, since
they can be extracted from the provided malware.
7.2 Release 1.1
In the next release of the Maliciadataset, we plan to include
the exploits extracted from the network captures of our hon-
eyclients (Sect. 3.4) and additional malware classification
information.
Exploits. This release will include an exploits tarball with
the 172 exploits collected, named using their SHA1 hash.
The database will contain an additional table where each
row represents one exploit file and contains its hash, size,
file type, and CVE label.
Updated malware classification. The 1.0 release includes
one month of unclassified malware samples, which were
collected after the DIMVA 2013 paper was written, but
before the dataset was released. The 1.1 release will update
the malware classification so that it covers all samples





In this section, we discuss implications of our work, avenues
for improvement, and suggest other applications.
Takedown challenges. Setting up a exploit server in the cloud
is a simple and cheap process, while taking down a exploit
server can be a complicated one and may cost little to the
exploit server owner, which can simply move to another
provider. We need to raise the cost for the exploit server
managers of one of their exploit servers being taken down
and make it less anonymous to rent them. Hosting providers
should incorporate processes to verify the identity of the
renter, assign reputation to payment accounts, and closely
monitor short leases, as these are more likely to be abused.
More emphasis is also needed on the attribution of the orga-
nizations running drive-by operations, and those providing
the specialized underground services supporting them. We
believe that this work is a step in that direction.
Criminal investigations. Our clustering is designed to be used
by law enforcement during the pre-warrant (plain view) phase
of a criminal investigation [53]. During this phase, criminal
activity is monitored and targets of importance are selected
among suspects. Our clustering can identify large operations
among all reported exploit servers, satisfying this require-
ment. The goal of the plain view phase is gathering enough
evidence to obtain a magistrate-issued warrant for the ISPs
and hosting providers for the servers in the operation.
Additional features. Other features can be incorporated to
our clustering to further identify servers with shared config-
uration. For example, we could incorporate the web server
version running in the exploit server and the registrant for
DNS domains pointing to the servers.
Improving coverage. In this work, we show that even with a
small number of drive-by download feeds, we can identify
exploit servers in the same operation. Adding more feeds
would improve our coverage, identifying more operations.
Acquiring feeds is challenging because many security ven-
dors are careful about sharing them since they consider them
a competitive advantage.
Other applications. The problem of distinguishing from a
pool of servers running the same software which servers are
managed by the same organization is not exclusive to exploit
servers. Malware kits pose similar challenges because they
provide configurable bot and C&C server software, shared
among all organizations buying the kit. Our technique could
be applied to this scenario to identify C&C servers in the
same operation.
9 Related work
A number of works have analyzed drive-by downloads. Wang
et al. [54] build honeyclients to find websites that exploit
browser vulnerabilities. Moshchuk et al. [30] use honey-
clients to crawl over 18 million URLs, finding that 5.9 %
contained drive-by downloads. Provos et al. [38] describe a
number of exploitation techniques used in drive-by down-
loads. They follow-up with a large-scale study on the preva-
lence of drive-by downloads finding that 67 % of the malware
distribution servers were in China [37]. Recently, Grier et al.
[19] investigate the emergence of exploit kits and exploitation
as-a-service in the drive-by downloads ecosystem, showing
that many of the most prominent malware families propagate
through drive-by downloads. Our work differs from prior
drive-by downloads analysis in that we focus on identify-
ing and understanding the properties of drive-by operations,
rather than individual exploit servers. Other work proposes
detection techniques for drive-by downloads [11,13,62] and
could be incorporated into our infrastructure.
Cho et al. [10], infiltrated the MegaD spam botnet and col-
lected evidence on its infrastructure being managed by multi-
ple botmasters. In contrast, our work shows how to automate
the identification of servers with shared management, group-
ing them into operations. In simultaneous work, Canali et al.
[9] analyze the security of shared hosting services. Similar to
their work, we also issue abuse reports to hosting providers,
but our focus is on VPS services, which are more adequate
for hosting exploit servers.
Prior works on running malware in a controlled environ-
ment have influenced our malware execution infrastructure
[21,24,43]. Our classification builds on a number of prior
works on behavioral classification techniques [2,4,5,7,19,
34,36,41] and incorporates the automated clustering of mal-
ware icons using perceptual hashing. We could also incor-
porate techniques to reduce the dimensionality in malware
clustering [20], to evaluate malware clustering results using
AV labels [35], and to “personalize” the generated network
fingerprints to the network where they are deployed [33].
10 Conclusion
We have proposed a technique to identify drive-by down-
load operations by clustering exploit servers under the same
management based on their configuration, the exploits they
serve, and the malware they distribute. Our analysis reveals
that to sustain long-lived operations miscreants are turning to
the cloud. We find that 60 % of the exploit servers are hosted
by specialized cloud hosting services. We have performed
what we believe is the first quantitative analysis of exploit
polymorphism. We observe that different types of exploits
are repacked differently; repacking can be integrated in the
exploit kit to be performed automatically, invoked manually
using external tools, and some exploit types (e.g., fonts) may
not be repacked at all. We have also analyzed the abuse report-
ing procedure with discouraging results: most abuse reports
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go unanswered and even when reported, it still takes several
days to takedown an exploit server.
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